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JUDGING EXPERTISE IN COPYRIGHT LAW
I. INTRODUCTION

This Article examines the relative expertise of the United States courts of
appeals in copyright law. While expertise may generate a variety of benefits, such
as greater efficiency, the benefit of interest in this study is the quality of the
courts' decisions. With a few exceptions, federal judges are generalists who have
jurisdiction over an enormous range of legal disputes: copyright law one day,
environmental law the next, antitrust the day after that. Judges, according to
Judge Diane Wood of the Seventh Circuit, run the "risk of winding up 'a mile
wide and an inch deep' when it comes to legal expertise-jack of all trades but
master of none."' Intellectual property law includes one of the few exceptions.
The regional courts of appeals have appellate jurisdiction over copyright and most
trademark appeals,2 but the Federal Circuit has appellate jurisdiction over most
patent appeals.3 Hence, generalist appellate courts resolve copyright and (most)
trademark cases, but a specialized (or semi-specialized) appellate court resolves
patent cases. Judge Henry Friendly thought patent cases go "beyond the ability
of the usual judge to understand without the expenditure of an inordinate amount
of educational effort . . . and, in many instances, even with it."4

Some

commentators think copyright litigation-and perhaps even trademark
litigation--should also be concentrated in a single court. In their view,
"copyright is a highly specialized and technical body of law, and some of its
aspects .. . would be best handled by specialized judges." 6 Specialized courts
allow judges to gain experience and therefore develop expertise. As one
anonymous court of appeals judge put it, "[w]hat you get, you learn a lot about."7
The question remains, however, as to whether courts produce better opinions in
the area of copyright law when they possess greater experience.
In many areas of the law, including copyright, the courts of appeals are the
most important producers of federal decisional law. The Supreme Court decides
only a small number of appeals, which leaves the courts of appeals as "mini' Diane P. Wood, GenerakstJudges in a Spedah'zed World, 50 SMU L. REV. 1755, 1756 (1997).
See 28 U.S.C.
1291 (2000) (establishing the general appellate jurisdiction for courts of

2

appeals); 28 U.S.C. § 1294 (2000) (identifying which circuits have appellate jurisdiction over a
particular district court); 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(B) (2000) (stating that decisions of the Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board are reviewable by the Federal Circuit).
1 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000) ("Jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit."). An exception is for patent disputes not raised in a plaintiff's well pleaded complaint. See
Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 834 (2002).
4 HENRY FRIENDLY, FEDERALJURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 156-57 (1973).
5Michael.
Landau & Donald E. Biederman, The Casefora Spedazed Copyright Court: E'minating
theJurisdictionalAdvantage,21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 717, 719 n.2 (1999).
6

Id. at 719.

7 DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS
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Supreme Courts in the vast majority of their cases." 8 If expertise yields a special
advantage to courts, as it may in the patent context, then perhaps concentrating
copyright litigation in a specialized or semi-specialized court of appeals would be
worthwhile. Given the tradition of generalist courts, however, this reform would
likely make sense only if there is strong evidence that expertise yields significant
benefits, one of which is higher quality decisions. Even without such a drastic
reform, simply identifying expertise among courts under the present system may
be beneficial. Cases are not necessarily distributed evenly across the circuits,
making expertise possible in the courts without changing the jurisdictional rules.
Some circuits have more opportunities to confront certain types of cases, and
courts with less experience can benefit from the greater experience of other
courts. Much as one court may give extra weight to the majority rule among the
courts, sometimes preferring the majority rule over the minority rule because it is
the majority rule,9 a court may also give extra weight to the decisions of other
0
courts perceived to possess the expertise that comes from greater experience."
This is not deference in any formal, rule-like sense, but deference in the informal
sense frequently noted by courts when evaluating the weight of non-binding
authorities.1"

'J. WOODFORD HOWARD,JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 58

(1981).
' See, e.g., La Cienega Music Co. v. ZZ Top, 53 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 1995) (offering two
reasons for its decision, the first being that its decision followed the majority rule among the courts).
Courts do not of course always follow the majority rule, but failing to do so is sometimes offered
as an argument against a decision. See United States v. Humphrey, 287 F.3d 422, 454 (6th Cir. 2002)
(Rosen, J., dissenting) (arguing against the majority's opinion in part because the majority's
interpretation conflicts with the ten other circuits to consider the question).
to See, e.g., McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781,786 (1997) ("Since the jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals includes Alabama, we defer considerably to that court's expertise in interpreting
Alabama law."); Verizon Cal., Inc. v. Peevey, 413 F.3d 1069, 1084 (9th Cir. 2005) (Bea, J.,
concurring) (remarking that "[t]he D.C. Circuit... has particular expertise in administrative law');
Peters v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting that "sister circuits' experience
construing the laws of the states within their jurisdiction may render their decisions persuasive');
CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Northbrook Excess & Surplus Ins. Co., 962 F.2d 77, 97 n.53 (1st Cir. 1992)
("m']he fact that a federal judge has had experience on the state bench may reasonably be thought
to enhance the weight to be accorded that federal judge's view of state law."). See also Samuel
Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A Managerial Tbeory of the Supreme Court's Responsibilties: An Empirical
Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 728 n.171 (1984) ('There may be situations in which a ruling by a
court of appeals deemed to enjoy expertise in a particular subject matter-such as the Second Circuit
in the securities field or the Ninth Circuit in cases presenting certain Indian rights or federal land
management disputes-may have the effect of foreclosing further percolation because of the
deference other courts will accord the ruling.").
" Formal deference to the expertise of other courts or judges is sometimes disallowed. See Salve
Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 239-40 (1991) (holding that a court of appeals erred in
deferring to the district court judge's expertise in state law). While Salve might be read broadly to
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The hypothesis in this study is that the courts of appeals with greater copyright
experience acquire expertise that results in higher quality decisions. 2 The test of
this hypothesis is to compare each circuit's relative experience with. copyright
litigation to its representation in copyright and intellectual property casebooks, on
the assumption that casebook editors generally prefer better decisions. Alone,
however, casebook representation points more to varying levels of influence than
to expertise. Courts with more influence in a particular area of the law should be
more highly represented in the casebooks. For the Supreme Court, influence is
automatic because of its nationwide jurisdiction, but for the courts of appeals,
nationwide influence is not automatic. Where there is competition among courts,
as there generally is among the courts of appeals, widespread influence should be
heavily tied to the quality of the courts' decisions. Suppose, however, that the
Second Circuit dominated the various copyright and intellectual property
casebooks with about 40% of the principal cases. This would suggest that the
Second Circuit, as compared to the other circuits, was more influential in the area
of copyright than the other circuits, but this finding would not necessarily indicate
that the Second Circuit possesses more competence in copyright law. The Second
Circuit might have published about 40% of the copyright opinions. And if this
pattern held across the circuits generally, it would suggest the circuits are of
similar competence and are simply representedin the casebooks in proportion to
their share of the published opinions. 3 In order to draw some (admittedly
tentative) conclusions about the relative expertise of the circuits, we need to know
more than just each circuit's share of the copyright opinions in the casebooks.

prohibit even informal deference to the expertise or skill of other courts or judges, such a reading
is at odds with common judicial practices. See, e.g., CPCInt'l,Inc., 962 F.2d at 97 n.53 (distinguishing
Salve). Cf Donohoe v. Consol. Operating & Prod. Corp., 982 F.2d 1130, 1138 (7th Cir. 1992)
(referring to "a distinguished district court judge, with a well-earned reputation for writing
meticulous, scholarly opinions"); FMC Corp. v. Glouster Eng'g Co., 830 F.2d 770, 772 (7th Cir.
1987) (implying that, when known, an important factor in deciding an appeal is "the reputation of
the district judge for care and skill in resolving factual disputes and making the many discretionary
determinations confided to trial judges'). Salve is best understood as targeting a form of deference
that is formal or rule-like, such as the form of deference described in Magill v. Travers Insurance Co.,
133 F.2d 709, 713 (8th Cir. 1943) ("In deciding what the highest court of a state would probably
hold the state law to be, great weight may properly be accorded by this court to the view of the trial
court. This court would be justified in adopting a contrary view only ifconvinced of eror.') (internal
citation omitted) (emphasis added).
12 Cf.Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, SpeciakedAdjuicaion, 1990 BYU L. REV. 377,
378 (1990)
("Most important, [a specialized] court's expertise should enable it to craft better opinions, especially
in fields where a small number of cases are now distributed rather thinly among the regional
courts.').
13 See Rodney L. Mott, JudicalInfluence, 30 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 295, 304 (1936)
(suggesting that
if influence was equal, courts would be represented in casebooks in proportion to the number of
opinions produced).
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While other factors are probably also important, we need to know, at a minimum,
each circuit's share' of the total copyright opinions published by the courts of
appeals collectively. Evidence that more experienced circuits are over-represented
in the casebooks relative to their caseloads would be evidence of experience
leading to valuable expertise.
This Article is organized as follows: In Part II, I explain the estimation of
each circuit's share of the copyright opinions (or caseloads) in the courts of
appeals. These data provide a measure of each circuit's experience with copyright
law. In Part III, I explain the calculation of each circuit's representation in the
casebooks. These data provide a measure of influence. Since influence is more
difficult to measure than experience, this Part is more detailed in terms of the
justifications for using casebooks and the details for doing so. In Part IV of this
Article, I combine the two sources of data, bringing experience and influence
together to determine whether any courts show disproportionate influence
relative to their experience.
II.

EXPERIENCE: CALCULATING COPYRIGHT CASELOADS

In determining each circuit's share of the copyright opinions in the courts of
appeals, the basic unit of analysis is an opinion, not a case. A single case can
result in multiple opinions and multiple opportunities to resolve copyright issues.
Measuring each circuit's share of the total copyright opinions is simply a matter
of counting up the number of copyright opinions issued by each circuit and then
dividing by the total number of copyright opinions issued by the circuits generally.
The hard question is, which opinions should count? Put another way, how
should copyright opinions be operationalized? Identifying the opinions of
particular judges is usually simple. A close-to-definitive list of most judges'
opinions can be generated in mere moments on LEXIS or Westlaw."4 Identifying
the opinions of a particular court is also simple. Identifying copyright
opinions--or civil procedure opinions or contract opinions-is more difficult.
While the upper limit of opinions is presumably the total number of opinions
with at least a single reference to copyright, many opinions with one or more
references to copyright do not actually confront any copyright issues." The more

It is slightly more difficult when there are multiple judges with the same last name, especially
when they served on the same court and at the same time, such as Judge Learned Hand and Judge
Augustus Hand, whose service on the Second Circuit overlapped from 1927 to 1954. See Federal
Judges Biographical Database, http://air.fjc.gov/servlet/tGetInfo?jid=965 (last visited Oct. 28,
2006) (discussing Judge Learned Hand); Federal Judge Biographical Detabase, http://air.fjc.gov/
servlet/tGetInfo?jid=964 (last visited Oct. 28, 2006) (discussing Judge Augustus Hand).
" See, e.g., Graham v.John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 n.1 (1966) ("The [patent] provision appears
in the Constitution spliced together with the copyright provision, which we omit as not relevant here.")
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references to copyright in the opinion, however, the more likely it is to contain a
genuine copyright issue.
Electronic searches for opinions with some minimum number of references
to copyright may generate reasonable estimates, but what should the minimum
be? No matter the choice, the search will include some irrelevant cases and
exclude some relevant ones. The goal is to minimize these errors, but the number
that will do so is unknown. Rather than conduct only a single search and hope
for the best, I used three searches. Together, the results provide a reasonably
narrow range in which the "true" number of copyright opinions is likely to be
found.
Using LEXIS, I operationalized copyright opinions with the following search
terms, varying the minimum number of required copyright references from five
to ten and then from ten to twenty:
OPINIONS(atleast5(copyright!)) and DATE(geq (1/1/1891) and
leq (12/31/2004)) and not COURT(bankruptcy) and not
NOTICE(unpublished or "not recommended for full-text
publication" or "without published" or "may not be cited" or "not
binding precedent")
While I do not use data from years prior to 1920 later in the analysis, I searched
every year from 1891, the beginning of the courts of appeals,16 to 2004. Each
search includes 1,261 circuit years' worth of data, 114 years apiece for the First
through Ninth Circuits, 112 years for the D.C. Circuit (1893-2004),"7 seventy-six
years for the Tenth Circuit (1929-2004),18 twenty-four years for the Eleventh
Circuit (1981-2004),"9 and twenty-three years for the Federal Circuit
(1982-2004) .20 1 omitted non-precedential opinions because in general, they do
not pose difficult or novel questions of law 2' and often result in less thorough and

(emphasis added).
16Circuit Court of Appeals (Evarts) Act, ch. 517, 26 Star. 826 (1891).
17 The history of the D.C. Circuit is somewhat more complicated than that of the other circuits.
Although it formally joined the courts of appeals in 1948, its year of creation is best traced to 1893.
See HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIRCUIT IN THE COUNTRY'S BICENTENNIAL YEAR 3 (1977). Seegeneral Susan Low Block & Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Celebrating the 200thAnniversagy ofthe Federal Courts ofthe Distict of Columbia, 90 GEO.
L.J. 549, 549-64 (2002).
18 Act of Feb. 28, 1929, ch. 363, 45 Stat. 1346 (establishing the Tenth Circuit).
19 Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452,94 Stat. 1994
(establishing the Eleventh Circuit).
0 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (establishing the
Federal Circuit).
21 See, e.g., Boyce F. Martin,Jr., In Defense of Unpublshed Opinions,60 OHIO ST. L.J. 177,190 (1999)
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less careful opinions.22 The parties to the litigation are the primary audience for
unpublished decisions, not the legal community generally. 2 3 Judges on the panels
probably read non-precedential opinions less carefully. Other judges on the court
may not read them at all. 24 Thus, they likely contribute much less to the judges'
experience. In addition to non-precedential opinions, I also omitted the decisions
of the bankruptcy appellate panels in the First and Ninth Circuits. After
obtaining the printed results from these searches, I examined them for errors,
such as the same opinion listed twice, and although they are included within the
United States Courts of Appeals databases in LEXIS, I manually excluded
opinions of the now defunct United States Circuit Courts.2"
The three searches provided varying estimates of each circuit's relative
caseload. One check on the consequences of using different searches is the
correlation between each pair of results in a particular year (i.e., between the
results for five and ten references, ten and twenty references, and five and twenty
references). If the correlations were perfect (r=1.0), the relative caseload of each
circuit would remain the same whether one searched for opinions with five, ten,
or twenty references. The stronger the correlations, the less important the number
of references searched for. In calculating these correlations, it is important to
.xclu.e ay yar, wicha.c.. .cui .ssu .no copyrg .. o.pinions. Fi
. ..
shows
the total number of published opinions in each year containing at least five
references to copyright, illustrating the low levels of litigation prior to the 1970s.
In numerous years, particularly in the early history of the courts of appeals, a
circuit might decide no copyright cases. When there are no opinions with even
five references to copyright, it is inevitable that there are no cases with ten or
twenty references. Likewise, when there are no cases with ten references, there
are no cases with twenty references. Including these many pairs of zeros would

("Unpublished decisions tend to involve straightforward points of law .

"); Stephen L. Wasby,

Pubication (orNot) ofAppellate Rulings: An Evaluation of Guideknes, 2 SETON HALL CIR.REv. 41, 117
(2005) ("Most assuredly there are unpublished dispositions the publication of which seems either
necessary or at least strongly suggested .... However, when the great bulk of these rulings are
examined, on the whole there seem quite few about which non-publication can be questioned.").
' See, e.g., Cottrill v. Spears, 87 F. App'x. 803, 804 (3d Cir. 2004) (conflating copyrighting with
copyright registration); William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, Eliism, Expeieng,and the New
Certiorari: Requiemfor the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CoRNELL L. REV. 273, 284 (1996) ("It should
come as no surprise that unpublished dispositions are also dreadful in quality.")
' See Stephen L. Wasby, UnpublishedCourt ofAppeals Decisions: A HardLook at the Process, 14 S.
CAL. INTERDIsc. L.J. 67, 96-98 (2004).
24 An article authored by thirty-three Ninth Circuit judges implies they attempt to stay current
only with the published opinions of the court. See Mary M. Schroeder et al., A Court United- A
Statement ofa Number of Ninth CircuitJudges,7 ENGAGE 63, 63 (2006). Practices may vary across the
circuits, especially in circuits with lighter caseloads.
5 See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
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affect the correlations in an unhelpful way. Imagine counting the number of
opinions issued monthly rather than annually and then daily rather than monthly,
adding more and more pairs of zeroes to the data set as the time frame narrows.
The correlations would increase, but the informative value of the correlations
would decrease.
FIGURE 1: OPINIONS WITH FIVE OR MORE REFERENCES TO COPYRIGHT
(ALL CIRCUITS COMBINED)

26

TABLE 1 reports the correlations for the results circuit-by-circuit and then for
the courts of appeals as a whole. For the circuits combined, the correlations are
quite strong, ranging from .896 to .961. For the individual circuits, they are also

26

The vertical lines represent the years in which the Copyright Act of 1909 and the Copyright

Act of 1976 went into effect, 1909 and 1978, respectively.
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quite strong, but there are a few exceptions. For the Tenth Circuit and the
Federal Circuit, the three searches yielded quite different results, but these two
circuits have had the lightest copyright caseloads. With fewer observations, the
results for these circuits are more susceptible to outliers. In general, however,
these results suggest that searches for various numbers of references provide
reasonable estimates of the relative copyright caseloads in each circuit-but they
are only estimates.
TABLE 1: SEARCH RESULT CORRELATIONS (1891-2004)27
CIRCUIT

n

5/10

n

5/20

n

10/20

First

48

.818**

48

.678**

42

.700**

Second

103

.957**

103

.885**

97

.918**

Third

44

.842**

44

.718**

32

.852**

Fourth

29

.925**

29

.804**

26

.848**

Fifth

43

.914**

43

.786**

38

.865**

Sixth

47

.920**

47

.844**

36

.875**

Seventh

57

.925**

57

.854**

50

.885**

Eighth

41

.903**

41

.744**

37

.836**

Ninth

64

.981**

64

.940**

56

.967**

Tenth

21

.722**

21

.285

16

.539*

Eleventh

23

.939**

23

.880**

22

.928**

D.C.

35

.874**

35

.683**

28

.759**

Federal

18

.803**

18

.584*

9

.302

All Circuits Combined

573

.961**

573

.896**

489

.932**

Note: n = number of years included in the calculation. Excluded are years where both searches yielded
no opinions. **p>.Ol*p>.05

' The data on which these correlations are based represent the entire population ofinterest-or
close to it-which presents problems for the interpretation of tests of statistical significance. See
general# Richard A. Berk, Bruce Western & Robert E. Weiss, StatisticalInferenceforApparentPopulations,
25 SOC. METHODOLOGY 421 (1995). The population, however, is dynamic-the basis for the "dose
to it." New cases and casebooks are continually published. For this reason, the tests of significance
are perhaps of some value.
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Unlike TABLE 1, TABLES 2A, 2B, and 2C provide information about the
precision of the measures over time, with decade-by-decade results. TABLE 2A
provides the total number of opinions found with each search. Although the raw
numbers are not shown circuit-by-circuit, TABLE 2B provides the lowest and
highest percentage of cases identified for each circuit. For example, using the
results for the three searches from 2000-2004, the First Circuit issued 5.7%,
5.2%, or 5.3% of the opinions in the court of appeals. Thus, the table reports a
low of 5.2% and a high of 5.7%. Using the low and high values in TABLE 2B,
TABLE 2C reports the differences between these two values. Again using the
example of the First Circuit from 2000-2004, the difference is a mere 0.5%. Not
all of the differences are so small. Many of the differences are much higher,
especially in the early history of the courts of appeals when there were fewer
cases. As the overall caseloads have increased, however, the variation has
decreased. The choice of measures is therefore less consequential as time goes on,
but there is enough variation in the results to warrant using the estimates of the
caseload ranges later in the analysis rather than estimates of the exact percentages.
TABLE 2A: CASELOAD ESTIMATES FOR ALL CIRCUITS COMBINED
YEAR

5 REFS

10 REFS

20 REFS

1890S

17

12

4

1900S

35

27

16

1910S

49

31

17

1920S

48

29

19

1930S

53

42

18

1940S

82

56

31

1950S

71

48

31

1960s

89

64

38

1970S

131

97

71

1980S

350

289

227

1990S

425

351

267

2000s

244

212

170

TOTALS

1594

1258

909
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III. INFLUENCE: CALCULATING CASEBOOK REPRESENTATION

In 1871, Christopher Columbus Langdell published the first casebook, A
Selection of Cases on the Law ofContract.28 Langdell's goal was "to select, classify, and
arrange all the cases which had contributed in any important degree to the growth,
development, or establishment of any of [the] essential doctrines" of contract
law.29 The cases he selected should therefore teach us more than just legal
doctrines. The cases should tell us something about the courts and judges that
most influenced the development of contract law prior to 1871. In his own
contracts casebook, Arthur Corbin suggested it is overly optimistic to think that
all of the important cases can be excerpted at any significant length in one
casebook.3 ° Corbin is probably right. Even in the early twentieth century, there
were simply too many to include all of the important historical cases along with
the contemporary ones. 31 Plus, whatever Langdell's preference, casebook authors
often prefer more recent cases that present the current state of the law.32 Some
casebook selections are not even particularly noteworthy, except for their
potential pedagogical value. The principal cases in a casebook are, on average,
more likely to be important than the cases referenced only briefly in the notes, but
there is room in every casebook for the author to make some idiosyncratic

2 It took decades for the case method to displace lecture- and textbook-based approaches to
legal education, but in 1914, the dean of the University of Michigan Law School described the case
method as "the principal, if not the exclusive, method of teaching in nearly all of the stronger law
schools of the country." Henry M. Bates, Recent Progress in Legal Education, in I BUREAU OF
EDUCATION, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION 225, 235 (1914). See also Alfred Z.
Reed, L galEducation, in OFFICE OF EDUCATION, DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, BIENNIAL SURVEY OF
EDUCATION 1926-1928, at 57, 63 (1930) (describing the prevalence of the case method). Two years
later, he described the case method as "fully vindicated" and "the principal method in a large
majority of the law schools." Henry M. Bates, LegalEducaion, in BUREAU OF EDUCATION, REPORT
OF THE COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION 197, 201 (1916). See also Alfred Z. Reed, LegalEducation,
in OFFICE OF EDUCATION, DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, BIENNIAL SURVEY OF EDUCATION
1926-1928, at 57, 63 (1930) (describing the prevalence of the case method).
29 CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL,A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS

vii (1871).
-0 See ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS SELECTED FROM DECISIONS

OF ENGLISH &AMERICAN COURTS ix (William R. Vance ed., 1921) ("It is hoped that enough of the
earlier material has been included to indicate continuity of legal history and to prove that the future
is influenced by the remote as well as by the recent past. But student and teacher must go elsewhere
for knowledge of the earlier periods.").
3 See Albert Ehrenzweig, The American Casebook: "Cases andMatenials, "32 GEO. L.J. 224,225-26
(1944) ("The rapidly growing mass of case material soon compelled the abandonment of early
experiments with casebooks offering 'complete' materials in systematic order with 'informational'
summaries.").
32 See Myron Moskovitz, On WritingA Casebook, 23 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 1019, 1028 (2000).

HeinOnline -- 14 J. Intell. Prop. L. 16 2006-2007

2006]

JUDGINGEXPERTISE IN COPYRIGHT LA W

choices, to choose some cases that no other author includes. Thus, the selection
of cases in a single casebook is a questionable guide for evaluating judicial
influence. The selection of cases across multiple casebooks is more promising.
As early as 1908, at least 171 casebooks had been published.33 Today, the number
is in the thousands.34 With dozens of casebooks on a particular subject, produced
over several decades by many experts in the field, casebooks can assist us in
evaluating the influence of particular courts and judges on both the present state
of the law and its historical development.
A. CASEBOOKS AND INFLUENCE

The sizable number of casebooks published since 1871 is a rich but largely
untapped source of data. There are very few quantitative studies that rely on
36
casebooks, perhaps only four.3" Rodney Mott's notable 1936 study is the oldest.
Since his study, few others have been published. The reason casebooks are little
used may simply be a lack of access. Casebooks are published at such a rapid clip
and in so many subjects that many libraries maintain limited collections. And at
least for measuring judicial influence, there is an alternative. The most common
method for measuring the influence of particular courts and judges is to rely on
citations in judicial opinions.37 Many decades after Mott's study, Richard Posner

" See Douglas W. Lind,An EconomicAna_sis ofEar#y Casebook Publshing 96 LAw LIBR.J. 95,102
(2004); see also
Albert Ehrenzweig, TheAmerican Casebook: "Casesand Materials,"32 GEO.L.J. 224,224
(1944) (suggesting that approximately one hundred casebooks were published annually inthe years
before World War 1I, but he is not precise about years or numbers).
4 A tide keyword search in the University of Chicago library catalog for "cases and materials"
resulted in 1,964 items. A similar search in the Harvard University catalog yielded 1,986 items.
Obviously, casebooks lacking the word "materials" are not included. On the other hand, casebook
supplements with the words "cases and materials" in the tide are included in these search results.
3 See Mim Gulati & Veronica Sanchez, Giantsin a World ofPjgmies? Testing the SuperstarH
Hpothesis
with JudiialOpinions in Casebooks, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1141 (2002); Jean Stefanic, Needks in the Haystack
FindingNew LegalMovements in Casebooks, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 755 (1998); RICHARD A. POSNER,
CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 90-91 (1990). Paul Verkuil described a less systematic effort
in a discussion of the D.C. Circuit's influence in administrative law:
But how do we prove distinctiveness in roles of circuit courts? I started to count
up the cases in the administrative law case books that involve the D.C. Circuit;
after a while that got to be a pointless activity, since there were so many. So, I
hope you will take it on faith that something like half the opinions in most of the
major casebooks and treatises derive from this court. Its influence is profound
for that reason alone.
Panel Discussion, The Contributionofthe D.C.CircuittoAdministrative Law,40 ADMIN. L. REV. 507, 532
(1988) (comments of Paul Verkuil).
3 See Mott, supra note 13.
3 Mott actually included citation counts in his study and found a very strong correlation
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used citation counts in his studies of Judges Benjamin Cardozo and Learned
Hand.38 William Landes, Lawrence Lessig, and Michael Solimine similarly relied
on citations to study the influence of courts of appeals judges and the courts of
appeals generally.39 Posner's study of Cardozo is also one of the few studies to
make some use of casebooks as a measure of influence.' But counting citations
in opinions is the norm, not counting principal cases in casebooks. Why turn to
casebooks to measure influence?
Before answering this question, the concept of judicial influence needs to be
defined. An influential case is one that is relevant for resolving subsequent
disputes or cases. An influential case can also be one that clearly resolves certain
questions and therefore prevents disputes or litigation from even arising. A case
may be influential because it is binding on lower courts or other decisionmakers
or because the opinion's reasoning is persuasive and often considered, if not
followed. Influence is not quite what Posner described as reputation, by which
he meant, "widely regarded in a good light.""' An opinion may be regarded in a
bad light and still be influential. A poorly regarded Supreme Court case is still
authoritative nationwide. Lower court judges no doubt maneuver around disliked
authorities from time to time, but the maneuvering itself is evidence of influence.
A poorly rearded court of appeals decision, however, is not authoritative
nationwide and will likely be influential only within its defined region. Influence
is therefore a function of authority and persuasive ability. It is also a function of
a court's docket. A court cannot influence an area of the law unless it has an
opportunity to decide relevant cases. The more cases it decides, the more likely
it is to influence the law's development.
For the principal cases selected by casebook authors to serve as valid
indicators of judicial influence, one or both of the following needs to be true:
either casebook authors tend to choose influential cases or they tend to choose
cases that later become influential. Not every case needs to be influential or
destined to be influential, but there must be a strong tendency for casebook
authors to select the influential cases of the past, present, or future. Although

between casebook representation and citations by other courts. Although Mort actually reported a
correlation of .89, id. at 310 n.24, this result appears to be an error. I recalculated the correlation
coefficient as .86. I discovered a few other errors in Mott's calculations, most probably due to
rounding. Calculating correlation coefficients in the 1930s was of course much more labor intensive
than today.
" Richard A. Posner, The LearnedHand Biography and the.Question ofJudidalGreatness, 104 YALE
L.J. 511, 534-40 (1994) ("A Citation Study of Learned Hand"); POSNER, supra note 35, at 74-91.
'9William M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig, & Michael E. Solimine, Jud'cialInfluence: A Citation
Anaysis of FederalCourts ofAppeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1998).
40 POSNER, supra note 35, at 90-91.
41 Id. at 58.
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casebooks have evolved from Langdell's original design and typically devote
substantial space to "materials," the principal cases are still "the guts of the
casebook"42 or the "main events. 4 3 The process of selecting these cases is a
critical part of writing a casebook, a process that authors take seriously." As
evidenced by reviews of casebooks, the professors who choose casebooks for
their courses are also quite interested in the cases selected.4" Authors therefore
have both a scholarly and a market incentive to select "good" cases.
While there are multiple factors that make a case "good," one of the factors
is whether the case is influential or not. In many fields of legal study, there are a
few cases that are practically essential, cases that will be included at length in all
or nearly all casebooks. Although it would be unthinkable to omit Miranda v.
AriZona from a criminal procedure casebook entirely, it would also be surprising
to omit Miranda as a principal case.4 6 Other cases, though not as essential as
Miranda in a criminal procedure casebook, will be chosen from a short list of
leading candidates for a particular issue. In a discussion of copyrights in useful
articles, for example, the short list includes several cases, such as MaZer v. Stein
(involving a lamp base),4" Kieseistein-Cordv. Accessories by Pearl,Inc. (a belt buckle),48
CarolBarnhar,Inc. v. Economy CoverCoro. (mannequin torsos), 49 BrandirInternational,
Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co. (a bicycle rack) ° and a few others.5' Students
could learn about copyright protection for useful articles--or any other topic-by
reading nothing but recent district court opinions. After all, district court
opinions often discuss influential appellate cases, 2 and casebook authors could
supplement district court opinions as necessary with notes and other materials.
In practice, however, casebook authors are unlikely to produce casebooks filled
42 Moskovitz, supra note 32, at 1025-26.
43 STANLEY D. HENDERSON, LABOR LAW iv

(2d ed. 2005).

44 See E. Allan Farnsworth & W.F. Young, A CasebookforAllSeasons?-Anotber Casebook Review,

21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 725, 728 (1998).
41 See Geoffrey R. Watson, A Casebook for All Seasons?, 20 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 277 (1997)
(reviewing E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH &WILLIAM F. YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS
(5th ed. 1995)); Clarke B. Whittier, Book Review, 31 YALE L.J. 220, 221 (1921) (reviewing ARTHUR
L. CORBIN, CASES ON CONTRACTS (1921)).
4' See Moskovitz, supra note 32, at 1026.
4' 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
4 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980).
49 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985).
so 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987).
51 See, e.g., Pivot Point Int'l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d
913 (7th Cir. 2004) (discussing
the copyrightability of a mannequin head); Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(evaluating the copyrightability of outdoor lighting fixtures). Pivot Pointis very recent and has not
yet been included in a casebook, but it would be an entirely serviceable choice.
52 See, e.g., Bonazoli v. R.S.V.P. Int'l, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 2d 218,222 (D.R.I. 2005) (reviewing the
caselaw dealing with copyrights in useful articles).
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only with district court opinions. Instead, authors'are likely to prefer cases from
more prominent and more influential courts.53 Professors want students to be
familiar with the leading appellate cases, and students are more likely to remember
the cases they have actually read rather than the cases they have only read about.
When the choices for principal cases are not predetermined or limited to a few
leading cases, casebook authors have more freedom to select the remaining cases.
Myron Moskovitz, the author of several casebooks, identified several criteria for
making these selections, ones that largely support the value of casebooks as a
measure of influence.54 First, the cases should deal with fundamental rather than
marginal issues.5 5 Presumably, cases dealing with marginal issues are less
influential. Marginal cases, along with marginal issues, can be handled in a
casebook's notes. Second, Moskovitz prefers to include cases from a variety of
jurisdictions.56 This consideration could result in some less influential cases being
selected in the interest of diversity, but it should also prevent a small number of
courts from dominating a casebook, unless those courts truly dominate a
particular area of law. Third, Moskovitz prefers recent cases. 57 Recent opinions
are more likely to contain current statements of the law, and they are more likely
to include facts or issues familiar to the students. Other casebook authors have
revealed a similar preference." For casebooks to be a useful indicator of judicial
influence over time, particularly when multiple editions of the same casebooks are
used, it is important that the authors reevaluate the selection of cases for each
new edition, retaining cases that remain important and discarding those that have
been eclipsed by more recent decisions. The market may exert some helpful
pressure here as well. If new editions contained only trivial changes, then
students might be more likely to purchase used copies of previous editions rather
than new copies of the latest edition. Authors therefore have a variety of
incentives to update their casebooks. APPENDIX A indicates just how often they
do so. Of Moskovitz's remaining criteria, one probably works against selecting
influential cases. He prefers cases with "bizarre facts-especially facts involving
sex."5 9 There is little reason to think that cases involving strange goings on,
whether about sex or otherwise, are more influential. But no one thinks every case

" See Moskovitz, supra note 32, at 1028-29.
54Id. at 1026.
-5Id.at 1026-27.
56 Id. at 1029.
-7 Id. at 1028.
s8See, e.g., Farnsworth & Young, supranote 44, at 729; HAROLD SHEPHERD, CONTRACTS AND
CONTRACT REMEDIES viii (3d ed. 1952); ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
ix (1921).
'9Moskovotz, supra note 32, at 1027. See Mott, supra note 13, at 304 (noting the preference of
casebook editors for cases with "interesting or unique facts").
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chosen for a casebook is a landmark or even a leading case. Some cases are
bound to be included more because they are entertaining than influential. Of
course, influence and titillation are not mutually exclusive.6'
Even when authors select less influential cases, they may subsequently acquire
influence as a result of being included in a casebook. While no casebook is
needed to make some cases influential, other cases need a bit of promotion, and
the more often a case is read, the more likely it is to become influential. Mott
noted the importance of influencing "the next generation of lawyers" in his
study.6 And Judge Kozinski occasionally writes an opinion with the goal of
getting it into the casebooks-and in front of thousands of law students.62
According to Kozinski,S clerks
offer a route through which casebooks can
63
effectively influence judges. To the extent judges delegate much of the opinion
writing to clerks, their exposure to the opinions in casebooks is all the more
important. Casebooks must influence professors too. Professors are repeatedly
exposed to the same cases as students. Presumably, this exposure impacts their
academic work, another possible avenue for influencing judges and the law
generally, at least to the extent judges read legal scholarship. 6' Not every
previously unknown case included in a casebook will subsequently become a hit,

See, e.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.
1979) (affirming the grant of a preliminary injunction prohibiting the distribution and exhibition of
Debbie Does Dallas due to the use of a uniform in the movie similar to the Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders' trademark uniform)..
61 Mott, smpra note 13, at 303-04.
62 Id. at 298-302. Judge Kozinksi provides the example of his opinion in Trident Center v.
Connecticut GeneralLife Ins., 847 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1988). He drafted Trident Center as an explicit
attack on Padfic Gas andElectric Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage& Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968),
in which Chief Justice Traynor, writing for the California Supreme Court, took a very broad view
of the legitimate use of extrinsic evidence in contract interpretation. Judge Kozinski was successful
in his goal of getting Trident Centerinto several contracts casebooks as a counterpoint to Padfic Gas.
See, e.g., ROBERT E. SCOTT&JODYS. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 660 (rev. 3d ed. 2002);
LON L. FULLER AND MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 622 (7th ed. 2001)
(digested at substantial length); ROBERT S. SUMMERS AND ROBERT A. HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND
RELATED OBLIGATION 688 (4th ed. 2001) (principal case);JOHN D. CALIMARIJOSEPH M. PERILLO
& HELEN HADJIYANNAKIS BENDER, CASES AND PROBLEMS ON CONTRACTS 343 (4th ed. 2000)
(principal case).
63 See Alex Kozinski, Who Gives aHootAboutLegalScholarsh?,37 Hous. L. REV. 295, 298 (2000).
Id.at 302-20. But see Richard G. Kopf, Do Judges Read the Review? A Citaion-CountingStudy of
the Nebraska Law Review and the Nebraska Supreme Cour, 1972-1996,76 NEB. L. REV. 708,714 (1997)
("tT]he research consistently proves that judges seldom cite law review articles."); Patricia M. Wald,
Teaching the Trade: An AppellateJudge's View of Practice-OrientedLegalEducation,36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 35,
42 (1986) ("My experience teaches also that too few law review articles prove helpful in appellate
decision making.').
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but casebooks are probably one of the more effective vehicles in the law for
getting people to notice a particular case.
Admittedly, these considerations about casebooks and influence are somewhat
speculative. Although there is substantial similarity between the casebook
selection criteria noted by Mott in the 1930s and those noted by Moskovitz a few
years ago, there is no systematic evidence, such as survey data, on how casebook
authors select cases, what factors they consider, or how they weigh these factors.
Nor are there any data available about the likelihood of students purchasing used
casebooks when professors make only minor updates in a new edition. It would
be helpful to know, for example, how merely "revised" editions sell as compared
to new editions. As in all research, whether empirical or otherwise, some
assumptions must be made, but it is a reasonable assumption that casebook
authors generally favor more influential cases and that casebooks may contribute
to the influence of the selected cases. These assumptions are also supported by
what empirical evidence is available. In addition to relying on the fifty-nine
casebooks in use at the time to measure the influence of state supreme courts,
Mott also surveyed the 600 law professors at member schools of the Association
of American Law Schools, receiving responses from 259 or 43.2% of them. 65 He
found a moderately strong correlation of .70 between the "esteem" in which the
different states' high courts were held by the respondents and the courts'
representation in the casebooks.66 Mott's questions were about the courts'
reputations in general, however. 67 Perhaps a study focused on particular subjects
and the experts in these subjects would have yielded even stronger correlations.
Assuming casebooks offer a valid method of identifying influential opinions,
they offer some advantages over counting citations in opinions. As noted earlier
in estimating the circuits' caseloads, one difficulty for evaluating influence in
particular subject areas is defining the relevant universe of cases. 6' Dealing with
the subsequent history of each case adds to the difficulty. Even if an opinion is
fairly designated as a copyright opinion, most opinions contain propositions of
law on multiple issues. A case largely about copyright might be cited for reasons
unrelated to copyright. The copyright portion of an opinion might be ignored in
subsequent cases while another portion of the opinion might be heavily cited. A
team of research assistants could solve this problem by carefully coding each
citation to the original case to determine why it was cited, but this method is
costly. Casebooks partially address both of these problems, first by identifying
a group of cases especially relevant to a topic, and second by eliminating the need

65 Mott, supra note 13, at 295-96.
6' Id. at 305 n.15.
67 Id. at 296.

' See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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to code subsequent histories. Even with casebooks devoted to copyright,
however, some consideration must be given to the relevance of individual cases.
Copyright casebooks do not contain only copyright cases.69
Another advantage of casebooks is that there are more constraints on
including principal cases in a casebook than there are on including citations in a
judicial opinion. The cost to add additional citations to an opinion is very low,
making it somewhat difficult to distinguish between the important citations and,
in the words of Landes, Lessig, and Solimine, the "decorative" ones. 0 Again, this
problem could be alleviated through the careful coding of opinions to determine
which cases are actually being discussed and which are being added to string cites
without comment, but casebooks offer another way around this problem. While
there are few limitations on citing cases in the notes of a casebook, the principal
cases take up valuable real estate. Professors rarely want or need four or five or
six cases on the same issue, and students do not want to buy books so thick and
costly that they can accommodate superfluous principal cases. On most issues,
professors and students probably want only one or two good cases, perhaps three
or maybe even four if an issue has generated significant conflict in the courts.
Thus, there is a greater incentive to make careful choices when selecting opinions
for a casebook than when selecting cases for a string cite.
Nevertheless, casebooks come with some limitations. Casebooks by necessity
must focus on the core issues of a particular subject. On the one hand, it is
desirable to focus on the central problems in a particular area of the law. On the
other hand, the sum total of all the "marginal" issues is likely significant. Relying
on the citations in opinions would allow one to include a more complete universe
of issues. Casebooks also involve the perspectives of fewer individuals. The
number of casebook authors in any one subject is much lower than the number
of judges who must deal with the subject. The number of authors producing
copyright or intellectual property casebooks at any one time also varies widely.
The same is likely true in many subjects. For these reasons, measures of influence
based on both casebooks and judicial opinions are useful. Each approach offers
its own advantages. As with the measurement of many abstract concepts,
including judicial influence, multiple methods are desirable. One of the
arguments of this paper, however, is that a measure based on casebooks is worth
adding to the methodological mix.

69 See, e.g., SHELDON W. HALPERN, DAVID E. SHIPLEY & HOWARD B. ABRAMS, COPYRIGHT

13-18 (1992) (including the patent case Grahamv.John Deere Co.); ALAN LATMAN, ROBERT GORMAN
&JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE EIGHTIES 40-45 (2d ed. 1985).
70 Landes, Lessig & Solimine, supra note 39, at 275.
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COPYRIGHT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASEBOOKS

The primary sources of data for this study are fifty-two casebooks, comprising
every copyright and general intellectual property casebook I could identify
through 2005. Of the fifty-two, thirty-one are copyright casebooks and twentyone are general intellectual property casebooks. I did not include four intellectual
property casebooks designated as only "revised" rather than new editions, on the
assumption that a mere revision is a less thorough reevaluation of the case
selections."' Nor did I include more specialized intellectual property casebooks,
such as ones on entertainment, Internet law, or international intellectual property.
Most of the fifty-two casebooks belong to a multi-edition series, ranging from
two to nine editions. 2 Only six of the casebooks stand alone as a single edition.
The authors are a distinguished group of thirty-nine experts on copyright and
intellectual property law, including six of the ten currently most cited intellectual
property professors: Paul Goldstein, Robert Merges, Mark Lemley, Jane
Ginsburg, Rochelle Dreyfuss, and Edmund Kitch."3 Also included are Melville
Nimmer and David Nimmer, the authors of the most cited treatise on copyright
law and one of the most cited treatises generally.7 4 APPENDIX D provides a
complete list of the casebooks.
Copyright and intellectual property casebooks are not, of course, published on
a uniform and regular schedule. Ideally, one would like an equal number of
casebooks from each author, with new editions regularly published at the same
time. Obviously, these ideal longitudinal data cannot be created with these or any
other casebooks. Many of these authors were not even alive when the first of
these fifty-two casebooks was published. The earliest casebook, authored by
Francis DeAk and Frederick Chait, dates back to 1940."s Benjamin Kaplan and

71

See PAULGOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES

(rev. 5th ed. 2004); PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE
DOCTRINES (rev. 4th ed. 1999); PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND

RELATED STATE DOCTRINES (rev. 3d ed. 1993); EDMUND W. KITCH & HARVEY S. PERLMAN,
LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS (rev. 4th ed. 1991).
72 Two casebooks, one by Sheldon Halpern alone, and one by Sheldon Halpem, David Shipley,
and Howard Abrams, are treated as separate series.
7"These rankings are based on Most Cited Law Faculty, 2002-2003. Brian Leiter, Welcome to
the New Leiter's Law School Rankings Website, http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/bleiter/
rankings02/topl0_most cited.html.
"4See Fred R. Shapiro, The Twenty Most Cited Legal Texts and Treatises (1978-1999), htrp://
lib.law.washington.edu/ref/mostcited.htrnl.
" Francis Deik and some of his early course offerings in intellectual property are briefly

discussed in FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN LEGAL HISTORY, A HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF
LAw COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 329,361 (1955). See also ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS,
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Ralph S. Brown's casebook, the second oldest, did not appear until twenty years
later. Indeed, a majority of the fifty-two casebooks were published within the past
fifteen years. TABLE 3 summarizes the publication rates by decade. Perspectives
from the 1970s, 1980s, and especially the 1990s and 2000s are well represented.
Earlier perspectives are not. Conclusions about these earlier periods are therefore
more tentative. While the casebooks offer considerable information about which
cases from the 1960s and earlier decades remain influential today, they provide
less information about which cases were most influentialfrom theperpectiveof these
earlier decades.
TABLE 3: CASEBOOK PUBLICATION RATES
DECADE

COPYRIGHT CASEBOOKS

GENERAL IP CASEBOOKS

TOTAL

1940S

1

0

1

1950s

0

1

1

1960S

1

0

1

1970S

4

3

7

1980s

6

3

9

1990s

11

7

18

2000s

8

7

15

TOTAL

31

21

52

While the pre-1970 perspectives are very limited in number, the pace of
change in the law of copyright was much less rapid prior to the 1970s. For
example, although there were several legislative enactments, 76 there was no general
revision to the copyright law between 1909 and 1976. Indeed, by one recent
count, "More pages of copyright law have been added to the U.S. Code in the past
decade than in the prior 200 years of the republic[.]77 In addition to the low level
of legislative activity, the level of litigation was relatively low and stable until the
1970s. 8 It was not until the early 1970s that the pace of litigation began to trend

DIRECTORYOF TEACHERS IN MEMBER SCHOOLS 1942-1943, at 59 (1942). I have located very little
information on Frederick Chait beyond that he was a 1935 graduate of Columbia Law School. See
COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL ALUMNI AssOCIATION, COLUMBIA LAW REGISTER 197 (1965).
76 For a short overview, see United States Copyright Office, Notable Dates in United States
Copyright, Circular l a, http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circla.html.
77 Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyngbt Law's DigitalFuture, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 63, 65
(2002-2003).
78See supra FIGURE 1.
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decisively upwards. It is surely no coincidence that the copyright and intellectual
property casebook business started to take off in the 1970s. Although stable and
modest levels of litigation are no guarantee of doctrinal stability, they suggest that,
prior to the 1970s, fewer casebooks could capture the developments of longer
periods of time.
While Deik and Chait's 1940 casebook offers a much desired early perspective
on copyright law, its validity as an indicator of national judicial influence is open
to question. Their Cases and Material on Copyright Protection was officially
unpublished. It was "prepared for the exclusive, private and confidential uses of
Classes in the Columbia University School of Law" in 1940.' 9 But it was not a
mere course packet. It was a carefully edited two-volume casebook, one used in
Columbia's copyright course for many years,80 and one that might have been
published had there been more demand for copyright casebooks in the 1940s.
While Columbia's course was not the first university level course on
copyright-Richard De Wolf offered a course at American University's School
of Diplomacy, Jurisprudence, and Citizenship as early as 1920 8 1 -it may have
been the first of its kind in a law school.82 Hence, Deik and Chait probably did
not prepare their casebook with a national market in mind-they prepared it for
students at Columbia. In terms of the principal cases in the casebook (and
without excluding any cases for subject matter reasons), the most highly
represented courts by far are the Southern District of New York (24.79/6), the
Second Circuit (21.1%), and the U.S. Supreme Court (11.1°/0). 8 3 All three courts
may be highly represented because of their great influence in the field of
copyright, but the Southern District and the Second Circuit may be highly
represented because Deik and Chait prepared the casebook for students in New
York. Presumably, Columbia students in the 1940s most often practiced in New
York City after law school. Deik and Chait may have favored the caselaw binding
in New York City for this reason.

79 1 Francis Deitk & Frederick Chait, Cases and Materials on Copyright Protection title page
(unpublished casebook 1940).
o See, e.g., Columbia University, 48 Columbia University Bulletin oflnformaion No. 30 at 42 (July 17,
1948) (listing Deik & Chait's casebook for the course on copyright).
8" See Richard Crosby De Wolf, Biographies of Registers of Copyrights, www.copyright.gov/
history/index.html; RICHARD C. DE WOLF, AN OUTLINE OF COPYRIGHT LAW (1925).
82 Tracking down the history of copyright education is difficult. The earliest comprehensive
study on this topic may be the one started by the World Intellectual Property Organization in 1969
and later updated in the early 1970s. See INTERNATIONAL BUREAU OF THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, TEACHING OFTHE LAW OF INTELLECTUALPROPERTYTHROUGHOUT
THE WORLD (3d ed. 1972); INTERNATIONAL BUREAU OF THE WORLD INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY
ORGANIZATION, TEACHING OF THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THROUGHOUT THE
WORLD (2d ed. 1971). I could not locate the first edition.
83 See infra TABLE 4.
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Despite the initial concerns about this casebook, there are two reasons for
concluding that Deik and Chait were not biased by local considerations in their
case selections. First, the casebook contains numerous French and even a few
Dutch cases, which suggests the authors took a broad view of the law.s8 Second,
the distribution of principal cases is similar to the distribution of cases cited in
Herbert A. Howell's The CopyrightLaw,5 the first edition of a popular treatise later
revised by Alan Latman and William Patry. 6 When Howell published it in 1942,
he was a former Assistant Register of Copyrights and based in Washington, D.C. 7
Unlike Deik and Chait, Howell published his book (with the Bureau of National
Affairs). Since there is nothing in a treatise analogous to a principal case in a
casebook, the comparison between the two books is not perfect, but there is no
obvious reason why Howell would have favored caselaw binding in New York,
unless New York was actually the center of copyright litigation.
Although the two books were intended for very different audiences and for
very different uses, the similarities in the case selections are striking. TABLE 4
presents the distribution of cases in both books. The top four courts are the
same and the percentages are quite close, though the Supreme Court fares better
in Howell's treatise than in Deik and Chait's casebook. At most, there is a slight
bias in favor of the Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit in
Deik and Chait, perhaps at the expense of the Supreme Court. A bias in favor
of controlling authorities in New York, however, would not adversely affect the
Supreme Court. Supreme Court case law is controlling nationwide. This suggests
the Supreme Court fared worse in Deik and Chait's casebook for some reason
other than a desire for locally relevant caselaw. Whatever the reason, their
casebook appears to be a reasonably valid indicator of the national importance of
the New York courts from the perspective of the early 1940s.

84

Defik & Chair, supra note 79.

s5 HERBERT A. HOWELL, THE COPYRIGHT LAW (1942).
86 See ALAN LATMAN, HOWELL'S COPYRIGHT LAW (rev. ed. 1979); WHIIAM F. PATRY,
LATMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAW (6th ed. 1986); 2 Francis Deik & Frederick Chair, Cases and
Materials on Copyright Protection 627-38 (unpublished casebook 1940).
87 Howell's preface is signed from Washington, D.C. See HOWELL, supra note 85, at iii.
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4: DISTRIBUTION OF CASES IN DEAK & CHAIT AND HOWELL

TABLE

(RANK ORDER)88
DEAK & CHArt (1940)

HOWELL (1942)

S.D.N.Y.

24.7%

S.D.N.Y.

23.2%

Second Circuit

21.1%

Second Circuit

18.6%

U.S. Sup. Ct.

11.1%

U.S. Sup. Ct.

15.3%

D. Mass.

4.2%

D. Mass.

E.D. Pa.

3.2%

N.Y. Sup. Ct.

N.Y.

2.1%

E.D. Pa.

2.5%

S.D. Cal.

2.1%

First Circuit

2.2%

First Circuit

2.1%

E.D.N.Y.

2.2%

E.D.N.Y.

2.1%

Seventh Circuit

N.Y. Sup. Ct.

Eighth Circuit

Seventh Circuit

S.D. Cal.

Ninth Circuit

D.C. Circuit

W.D. Pa.

1.6%

Third Circuit

Mass.

1.6%

Fifth Circuit

1.4%

18.9%

Ninth Circuit

1.4%

Other courts

17.2%

Other courts

C. IDENTIFYING THE PRINCIPAL CASES

As before, the unit of analysis is an opinion, but I will continue to refer to
"principal cases," which is the more common terminology. To identify these
cases in the fifty-two casebooks, I did not rely on each casebook's table of cases.
There are two problems with these tables. First, many of the tables contain

These percentages are based on 190 principal opinions identified in the text of De~ik and Chait
and 366 cases listed in the table of cases in Howell. Only the decisions of American courts are
included in these numbers, but no cases were excluded due to their subject matter. Cases decided
by the now defunct circuit courts are credited to the local district courts (e.g., C.C.S.D.N.Y. is treated
as S.D.N.Y.).
8

HeinOnline -- 14 J. Intell. Prop. L. 28 2006-2007

20061

JUDGING EXPERTISE IN COPYRIGHT LAW

errors, sometimes quite a few. Occasionally, a principal case is missing entirely. 9
More often, cases that are formatted as principal cases in the main text are not
italicized, bold-faced, or otherwise formatted as principal cases in the tables.
Second, principal cases are not defined consistently in the tables. In some tables,
cases digested at length are counted as principal cases.9" In other tables, digested
cases are not counted as principal cases. 91 Moreover, the definition of a principal
case sometimes varies across multiple editions of the same casebook. 92
Regardless of how the cases are defined in the tables of cases, every casebook
adopts some unique and prominent formatting for what we might call the "toplevel" cases. For example, in the first edition of Melville Nimmer's casebook, the
top-level cases include the name of the case centered and bold-faced on the first
line, the court and year of decision on the second line, and the citation on the
third line. The author of the opinion follows, sometimes preceded by the entire
panel.93 These top-level cases generally receive the most space and attention in
the casebooks, but once in a while, a case is digested and discussed at greater
length than some principal cases.94 One could define the cases of interest in terms
of the space devoted to them, regardless of how they are formatted. A relevant
case could be defined as one that takes up at least some predetermined amount
of space, an inch, a page, or some other unit of measure.95 Words could even be

89 See, e.g., ALAN LATMAN, ROBERT A. GORMAN &JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE

EIGHTIES 91, 618 (2d ed. 1985) (omitting Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365 (5th
Cir. 1981), from the table of cases).
90 See, e.g., ROBERTA. GORMAN &JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHTS: CASES AND MATERIALS

17, 905 (5th ed. 1999) (classifying MaZerv. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954), as a principal case).
91 See, e.g., ROBERTA. GORMAN &JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT XXXII 79-80 (6th ed. 2002)

(digesting Sebastian Int'l,Inc. Consumer Contact (PTY) Lid., 664 F. Supp. 909 (D.N.J. 1987), but not
counting it as a principal case).
92 Compare PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE

DOCTRINES xxxii, 669-70 (2d ed. 1981) (identifying Sheldon v. Metro-Goidmyn PicturesCoro., 81 F.2d
49 (2d Cir. 1936), as a principal case), with PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK
AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES xxii, 588-89 (4th ed. 1997) (identifying the same case and excerpt

as a non-principal case). The difference is not due to an error in the table of cases. In examining
other entries in the table, it is clear that the definition of a principal case differs in the two casebooks.
93 See, e.g., MELVILLE B. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT AND OTHER ASPECTS OF LAW PERTAINING TO
LITERARY, MUSICAL AND ARTISTIC WORKS 1, 15 (1971). In Gorman and Ginsburg's sixth edition,

as a second example, the top-level cases include the name of the case left-justified, bold-faced, and
printed in a larger font on the first line, the citation and court on the second line, and a darkened
square followed by the author of the opinion on the third line. See, e.g., ROBERTA. GORMAN &JANE
C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT: CASES AND MATERIALS 29 (6th ed. 2002).
9' See, e.g., CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 741-48 (6th ed. 2003) (discussing and
excerpting Lotus Dev. Cop. v. BorlandInt'l, 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995)).
" In their study of casebooks, Gulati and Sanchez counted opinions of at least one page in
length. Gulati & Sanchez, supra note 35, at 1154.
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counted. But as a practical matter, these approaches are complex and costly. The
reasonable alternative is to record the cases the authors themselves chose to
highlight through the most prominent formatting option in the casebook. These
top-level cases are the ones I define as principal cases, regardless of whether the
author of a particular casebook defined the principal cases more broadly in the
table of cases. This definition allows for easy identification of the relevant cases
and probably tracks the most common understanding of what counts as a
principal case.
While the principal cases can be reliably identified, not all of the principal cases
in these casebooks are relevant to a study about copyright law. Even the
casebooks primarily about copyright contain cases that are clearly not about
copyright, such as a patent or trademark case provided as an example of other
forms of intellectual property.96 And of course, the general intellectual property
casebooks cover patents and trademarks in detail.97 Patent and trademark cases
might be fairly easy to classify as non-copyright cases, but other types of cases are
more difficult. Cases dealing with misappropriation are a good example.98 The
difficult question is, which cases should count as copyright cases? In a trivial
sense, all cases are relevant. Cases about patents offer some insight into what
copyright is not. The boundaries between different areas of the law however,
need not be perfectly defined. The boundaries are practical in nature, and
workable distinctions can be made. The casebooks themselves are evidence of
this. Thus, some cases must be strained out of the data set, even if the definition
of a copyright case is somewhat arbitrary at the margins, but they need to be
strained out in a consistent and reliable manner.
I compiled the initial list of principal cases according to the following rules.
In the copyright casebooks, I recorded every principal case, regardless of topic,
with two exceptions. I omitted completely all non-American cases and all cases
in the chapters on defamation and privacy torts in the Nimmer series.99 These tort
cases are too far afield from the present inquiry and no other copyright casebooks
include chapters on these topics. In the intellectual property casebooks, I counted
the cases from each section focusing on copyright, meaning the word "copyright"

96See, e.g., SHELDON W. HALPERN, DAVID E. SHIPLEY & HOWARD B. ABRAMS, COPYRIGHT:
CASES AND MATERIALS 13-18 (West 1992) (including Graham v.John Deere Co., 338 U.S. 1 (1966),
as a principal case).
9' See, e.g., EDMUND W. KITCH & HARVEY S. PERLMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION 165--363, 801-1085 (5th ed. 1998).
98 See, e.g., Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
9 In the first edition of the Nimmer series, I excluded only chapter eleven. In the subsequent
editions, this material is divided up among chapters thirteen, fourteen, and fifteen; therefore, I
excluded these three chapters in all subsequent editions.
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appeared in the chapter or section heading. 0 Where the topic of preemption was
treated in its own section, as it often is in intellectual property casebooks, I
counted all cases from these sections. Where there was one, I also included any
cases included in a general introductory chapter. I excluded the chapters on
patents, trademarks, or other topics. APPENDIX D fists the exact pages included
from each of these casebooks. As I did not count every case in the intellectual
property casebooks, I sometimes counted the same case in one casebook but not
in another. I always counted misappropriation cases in a copyright casebook
(provided it was not in one of the omitted Nimmer chapters), but I did not count
the same case in an intellectual property casebook, unless it appeared in one of the
included sections, i.e., a general introduction, a general preemption section, or a
copyright section. While this approach may seem odd, it produces a desirable
effect: cases on the borderline of copyright law are counted less often. Also, as
the intellectual property casebooks devote less space to copyright issues than a
copyright casebook, they must focus on the core issues. Thus, by including the
intellectual property casebooks in the study, the cases dealing with the most
important issues are counted more often.
From this initial list of 839 cases, the next step was to remove the cases not
dealing with copyright. This screening process was tied to the number of
references to copyright in the opinions. In determining the number of references
in the opinions, I relied on the original text, not the excerpts of the opinions in
the casebooks. Where a decision was not unanimous, I added up the references
in the separate opinions. I did not count references in any headnotes or other
materials outside of the opinion text. I automatically removed all cases without
at least one reference to copyright. This eliminated thirty-three cases.'0 ' I
automatically retained all cases with at least five references to copyright, on the
assumption-tested against a small number of cases-that cases with at least five
references typically contain a significant copyright issue.'0 2 This preserved 713

" A slight exception is E. Ernest Goldtein's 1959 casebook. See E. ERNEST GOLDSTEIN, CASES
AND OTHER MATERIALS ON THE FUNDAMENTALS OF PATENT, TRADE-MARK, AND COPYRIGHT

LAW (Foundation 1959). Except for one very short chapter, each chapter is organized into three
distinct parts: Part A covers patents, Part B covers trademarks, and Part C covers copyright. Only
in Chapter 8 is the word "copyright" missing from the title of Part C, yet it is clearly the part devoted
to copyright. Id. I therefore included all cases from Chapter 8, Part C.
01 Some examples of notable cases eliminated under this rule are the following: TwoPesosv. Taco
Cabana,505 U.S. 763 (1992);Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476 (1964);Ar0
Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336 (1961); Kellogg Co. v. Nat'lBiscuitCo., 305 U.S.
111 (1938); and State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cit. 1998).
02 As a practical matter, this test is most easily conducted with a browser that will highlight
particular words, such as Mozilla's Firefox browser. In this case, the word was "copyright." The
browser will highlight "copyright" even if it is part of a larger word, such as "copyrightability."
Some older cases use "copy-right" with the hyphen. See, e.g., Bartlette v. Crittenden, 2 F. Cas. 981,
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cases. Left over were sixty-three cases, each having from one to four references
to copyright. These cases required closer scrutiny.
In examining each of these sixty-three "ambiguous" cases, the basic question
was whether a case could plausibly be cited for some proposition of copyright
law, even if copyright issues did not dominate the opinion. As an example, a right
of publicity case with even a short discussion of preemption under federal
copyright law would qualify as a copyright case. This standard is fairly generous,
but these cases do, after all, come from copyright and intellectual property
casebooks. After reviewing these cases, I eliminated twenty-eight and retained
thirty-five.' The judgment about whether a case met the standard was inherently
subjective, and some cases were harder to evaluate than others. I therefore asked
a colleague to recode half of the cases, randomly chosen."° Our judgments were
in agreement in twenty-nine of the thirty-one cases for an agreement rate of
93.4%. Cohen's kappa, a more conservative measure of inter-coder agreement,
is .868."' As a rule of thumb, this level of agreement is considered "almost

981 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847). i counted these references as well.
103 As a few examples, I retained the following notable cases: Compco Corp. v. Da-BiteLightin&

Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879); and Shostakovich v. Twentieth CentuyFox Film Corp., 196 Misc. 67 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1948). A hard case that I eliminated was Wbite v. Samsung
Elecs. America, inc., 971 F.2d i395 (9th Cit.r. i992). -e latent copyright issues in this case were not
made explicit until Wbite v. SamsungElecs.America, Inc., 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting), which I easily retained under the five-reference rule.
'04 I discovered the 1959 casebook by E. Ernest Goldstein after this recoding process was
completed. As a result, one case with only two references to copyright, Thompson v. Gernsback, 94 F.
Supp. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), was not among those that could be randomly chosen for recoding. I
retained this case as a copyright case. The complete coding instructions were as follows:
Attached are 31 opinions, randomly selected from a set of 62 opinions. Each
opinion contains at least one reference to the word "copyright" or a variation on
the word, such as "copyrightability" or "uncopyrighted." The question for each
of these opinions is whether it can reasonably count as a "copyright case,"
broadly understood. The copyright issue or issues need not dominate the
opinion, but the opinion should contain some statement about copyright, one
dealing with an issue of common law copyright, statutory copyright, or the
constitutional dimensions of the copyright. The copyright issue(s) need not
dominate the opinion; the discussion(s) of copyright could even be very brief.
One way to approach each opinion is to consider whether you could plausibly
cite it for a proposition of copyright law.
On each opinion, please write "yes" if you think it can fairly count as a
copyright case as defined above or "no" if you think it should not count.
105 A certain amount of agreement can be attributed to chance. Cohen's kappa reflects this
possibility and a kappa of 0 is possible even with some agreement, but it would be a level of
agreement that could be due to chance alone. See J. Richard Landis & Gary G. Koch, The
Measurement of ObserverAgreementfor CategoricalData,33 BIoMETRIcs 159, 165 (1977).
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perfect."'1 6 As the sample of thirty-one cases is small, the standard error is
relatively large (.09), but the lower limit of the 95% confidence interval is a kappa
of .69, which is still considered "substantial" agreement under the standard rule
of thumb. 7 After the elimination of the 91 (63 + 28 = 91) "non-copyright"
cases, 748 (839 - 63 - 28 = 748) copyright cases remained in the data set.
Before turning to the analysis of these cases, one coding issue remains. It is
not obvious how best to classify twenty-one opinions of the now defunct circuit
courts."0 ' Eleven of these decisions are from the Circuit Court, Southern District
of New York; three from the Circuit Court, District of Massachusetts, including
Justice Story's decisions in Folsom v. Marsh'0 9 and Emerson v. Davie," and two
from the Circuit Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The remaining five
decisions are from five other courts."' The question is whether to classify these
decisions as decisions of the circuit courts or as decisions of the local district
courts.
Although four of the twenty-one cases are more problematic, classifying all of
them as district court decisions makes sense. In 1912, the circuit courts were
merged with the district courts, but they ceased to function as truly separate
courts well before 1912.112 Fifteen of these twenty-one cases were decided after
1869, by which time "the circuit courts were predominantly mere replicas of the3
'
district courts, more often than not presided over by the same district judge.""
Of the remaining six cases decided prior to 1869, district court judges actually
decided two. This leaves four cases that present a real classification difficulty. As
little turns on how these four cases are classified, I also credit them to the local

106 Id.
107

Id.

10s
See general# ERWIN C. SURRENCY,

HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 35-64 (2d ed. 2002).

0 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
11 8 F. Cas. 615 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845).
...Fonotipia, Ltd. v. Bradley, 171 F. 951 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1909); Am. Mutoscope & Biograph Co.
v. Edison Mfg. Co., 137 F. 262 (C.C.D.N.J. 1905); Reed v.Holliday, 19 F. 325 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1884);
Osgood v. Allen, 18 F. Cas. 871 (C.C.D. Maine 1872); Bartlette v. Crittenden, 2 F. Cas. 981 (C.C.D.
Ohio 1847).
112 See 36 Stat. 1087,1167 (1911) ('The circuit courts of the United States, upon the taking effect
of this Act [i.e., January 1, 1912], shall be, and hereby are, abolished ....All suits and proceedings
pending in said circuit courts on the date of the taking effect of this Act... shall thereupon and
thereafter be proceeded with and disposed of in the district courts ... "). For reasons unclear to
me, a few opinions were issued by the circuit courts even after theirJanuary 1, 1912 abolition. See,
e.g., New York Times Co. v. Star Co., 195 F. 110 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1912).
113 FELIX FRANKFURTER &JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 128
(1928). See also SURRENCY, supranote 108, at 63 ("Between 1869 and 1891, any advantage of having
two separate courts slowly disappeared . ...).
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district courts, which at least maintains the consistency in how these cases are
handled. 14
TABLES 5 and 6 summarize the results for the courts generally and for the
courts of appeals specifically. In APPENDIX B, TABLE 5 is reproduced in greater
detail, providing the breakdown for each casebook. Because the number of
principal cases in the casebooks varies widely, all of the results in these tables are
provided in terms of percentages. In comparing the courts, the important issue
is how much space is allocated to each circuit relative to the other courts. Using
the raw numbers would make comparisons between casebooks more difficult.

114A similar problem was how to classify the court in Martin Luther King Jr., Centerfor Social
Change, Inc. v. American HeritageProducts, Inc., 694 F.2d 674 (11 th Cir. 1983). After certifying several
questions about Georgia's right of publicity to the Georgia Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit
reversed the district court in a short per curiam opinion, attaching the Georgia court's opinion as an
exhibit. Id at 674. Formally, this is an Eleventh Circuit opinion, but the Georgia Supreme Court
did the real work. Therefore, I treated this opinion as MarinLuther Kin&Jr., CenterforSocial Change,
Inc. v. American HeritageProducts,Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982).
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IV. ANALYSIS
The data presented thus far provide estimates of each circuit's relative
experience and influence in terms of copyright law. These data clearly show that
experience and influence are not evenly distributed across the courts. The data
also provide an opportunity to measure the potential expertise of those circuits
with much greater experience than the other circuits. The assumption is that
disproportionate influence relative to experience is a sign of expertise. Only two
circuits, the Second and the Ninth, plausibly possess sufficient experience with
copyright litigation to acquire substantially greater expertise relative to the other
circuits. Overall, the Second Circuit is the clear leader in terms of experience and
influence. While data for the district courts is not provided in the caseload
estimates, the Southern District of New York is in fact the busiest copyright court
in the country, which translates into the Second Circuit being the busiest court of
appeals. For much of the Twentieth Century, the Ninth Circuit lagged far behind
the Second Circuit. California, despite being a center of intellectual property
creation, has not hosted nearly as much copyright litigation as New York City.
As shown in TABLE 2B, the Second Circuit consistently published at least 31.3%
of the copyright opinions from the 1890s through the 1970s, more than any other
circuit by wide margins. In the 1980s, however, the Second Circuit published only
22.5% to 23.5% of the opinions, its lowest share of the century. The Ninth
Circuit overtook the Second Circuit in the 1980s, publishing a little over 25% of
the opinions. While the Second Circuit moved back into the lead in the 1990s,
its share of the opinions remained under 30%. From 2000 to 2004, the Ninth
Circuit again overtook the Second Circuit, with the Second Circuit's share
dropping below 20% for the first time.
Despite the recent slippage in the Second Circuit's relative caseload, the
Second and the Ninth Circuits remain the most plausible circuits to have
developed expertise in copyright. With the exception of the past five years, the
Second Circuit has consistently published more than 20% of the copyright
opinions, and the Ninth Circuit has consistently published more than 20% of the
opinions since the 1960s. No other circuit approaches the Second and the Ninth
in terms of experience. While the First Circuit possibly published a fifth or more
of the opinions in the 1890s and 1900s and the Seventh Circuit may have
published a fifth or more in the 1900s, the total number of opinions published in
these decades was quite low. Small numbers can produce large percentages in
these periods. If there is expertise to be found in the circuits, at least expertise
due to the judges' experience with appellate decisionmaking, then it will be found
in the Second and Ninth Circuits.
As can be seen in TABLE 5, and in more detail in APPENDIX B, the Second and
Ninth Circuits, along with the Supreme Court and the Southern District of New
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York, are the most influential courts in the development of copyright law.
Together, these four courts account for at least two-thirds of the principal cases
in every casebook. The Supreme Court's share of the cases, however, cannot be
very illuminating in terms of expertise. The Supreme Court does not need to
produce a good opinion to make it into the casebooks. Since it is automatically
influential, it simply needs to produce an opinion on an important issue to earn
a spot in the casebooks. It is much more remarkable that a district court is so well
represented. Unlike the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals, the Southern
District of New York's opinions are not binding on any courts. Over time,
however, the Southern District's influence has declined, probably as a result of
appellate opinions displacing district court opinions. When appellate opinions are
not available on a particular issue, casebook editors must turn to the district
courts. As appellate opinions become available, they should usually be preferred
since appellate opinions typically carry more weight.
Focusing on the distribution of cases only within the courts of appeals, TABLE
6 also makes clear that the circuits are not equal in terms of influence. If the
courts of appeals were equally represented, then, at least from 1983 to the present,
about 7.7% of the principal cases would come from each circuit. Prior to the
creation of the Eleventh Circuit and the Federal Circuit in the early 1980s,115 the
percentage would be 9.1%. Prior to the creation of the Tenth Circuit in 1929,116
the percentage would be 10%. But the Fourth, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, D.C. and
Federal Circuits never achieve 7.7% of the principal cases in even a single one of
the fifty-two casebooks. The Sixth Circuit exceeds this minimum in only one
casebook. While the First, Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits occasionally break
7.7% in a single casebook, casebook series, or decade, these circuits regularly fail
to do so. Only the Second and Ninth Circuits regularly exceed this minimal
percentage. Of course, they also decide more of the cases. The important
question is whether they perform even better than their share of the cases would
suggest.
There are multiple ways in which the caseload and casebook data might be
compared to determine which circuits, if any, are more influential than their share
of the caseloads would suggest. The results of the three searches for determining
caseloads might be averaged and then compared to the casebook data. These
caseload numbers, however, are inevitably imprecise. It therefore makes more
sense to use caseload ranges of the sort contained in TABLE 2B. Using these
ranges, comparisons might be made.using the entire period of time up to the
publication of each casebook, rather than the decade-by-decade approach of
TABLE 2B. In other words, for a casebook published in 1986, one might compare

...See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
"6 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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the distribution of principal cases in it to the caseload distribution from 1891 to
1986. This approach would mean considering classic copyright cases in the
analysis even when they are much older than the casebook. Although Judge
Learned Hand is not very relevant to whether the Second Circuit currently
possesses expertise in copyright, the practical effect of using all the data up to the
point of a casebook's publication year would be that Judge Learned Hand's
opinions would contribute to the measure of the Second Circuit's expertise even
today. To avoid a "Hand effect," it makes more sense to compare the cases in
each casebook to a more confined period of caseload data. While the choice is
somewhat arbitrary, I use the twenty years prior to the publication of each
casebook, not including the year of publication. By excluding the year of
publication, there is no need to determine the exact dates of publication for both
the casebooks and for the cases represented in the caseload data.
What of relevant control variables? As noted in the discussion of the
casebook data, casebook editors do not choose opinions based on only one
factor. Unfortunately, potentially relevant control variables are not easily
operationalized. For example, while casebook editors may prefer some cases
-because the subject matter of the litigation is more interesting than the subject
matter of higher quality opinions, there is no practical way to operationalize the
"sex appeal" of each circuit's cases to determine whether there is any variation
among the circuits. Nor is there any practical way to measure the pedagogical
value of each circuit's cases. The present analysis is therefore limited to only two
variables: caseloads and casebook representation. The omission of control
variables makes the findings tentative, but even if measures of these other
variables were available, there would still be problems with using multivariate
regression. The least of these problems is that the relationship is by hypothesis
nonlinear. The hypothesis is that the representation of circuits in casebooks is
disproportionately greater for the circuits with heavier caseloads, which would
mean determining whether the slope of the regression line for circuits with lighter
caseloads is different than the slope for circuits with heavier caseloads. While this
problem could be solved with dummy variables, other problems are not so easily
dealt with. The data are time-series-cross-sectional data (TSCS), with casebooks
being the units repeatedly observed over time, but there are different numbers of
editions of each casebook, ranging from one to nine editions. In any given year
since 1940, from zero to five casebooks were published. There are simply too few
observations per unit and too little balance in the annual observations for a TSCS
regression analysis to make much sense." 7 As Lon Fuller once noted, a "method
cannot intelligently be selected merely because it is 'sophisticated'.... It can only

17

See Nathaniel Beck, Time-Series--Cross-Section Data: What Have We Learned in the PastFew

Years?, 4 ANN. REV. POL. ScI. 271, 272 (2001).
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be wisely chosen because it fits the thing it tests."" 8 Sometimes, a rudimentary
method is a better fit.
In analyzing the two sets of data, I compared each circuit's casebook
representation with its share of the overall copyright caseload, where the caseload
shares are based on the ranges generated by the three searches described in Part
II. Where a circuit's casebook representation is within its caseload range, the
circuit's representation is scored as zero for that casebook. In this situation, we
cannot be confident that the circuit's share of the principal cases is any different
than its share of the caseload. Where a circuit's casebook representation exceeds
its caseload range, the circuit's representation is scored as a positive number, equal
to its casebook representation minus the higher value of the caseload range.
Where a circuit's casebook representation falls below its caseload range, the
circuit's representation is scored as a negative number, equal to its casebook
representation minus the lower value of its caseload range. For example, 38.9%
of the principal cases in Brown and Denicola (9th ed. 2005) are Second Circuit
cases. The Second Circuit's share of the overall caseload from 1985 to 2004 is
between 21% and 22.4%. Hence, the Second Circuit's casebook representation
exceeds its share of the cases by at least 16.5% (38.9% - 22.4% = 16.5%). TABLE
7 summarizes the results of this analysis.

"' Lon L. Fuller, An Afterward: Science and the Judidal Prcess, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1604, 1616
(1965-1966).
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The results in TABLE 7 are mixed. On the one hand, the Second Circuit is
consistently overrepresented in the casebooks, no matter how the data are
averaged. Whether based on casebooks in general, copyright casebooks,
intellectual property casebooks, casebooks published within certain decades, or
even casebook series (where an opinion is counted only once per series), the
Second Circuit always performs substantially better than the other circuits. The
Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, performs much less well. Across all casebooks
generally or only across all copyright casebooks, the Ninth Circuit's representation
is less than one percentage point greater than its share of the cases. In the face
of measurement error, this slight over-performance is unimpressive. Across all
casebook series, the Ninth Circuit performs no better than the Third Circuit.
Only in the casebooks from the 2000s is the Ninth Circuit both over-represented
and outperforming all of the other circuits, save the Second Circuit. The results
for those casebooks published in 2000 and beyond take into account caseloads
only back to the 1980s, a time period in which the Second Circuit and the Ninth
Circuits achieved a rough parity of experience, yet the Ninth Circuit's casebook
representation still exceeds its highest caseload estimates by only 5.4%, whereas
the Second Circuit's does so by 10.3%.
While the data point in two different directions, one circuit apparently
benefitting from experience and one apparently not, there are two plausible
explanations for these data. One explanation is that the Ninth Circuit might be
an anomaly due to its unusual size or some other systemic characteristic. 9 The
Ninth Circuit does have a problem with its reputation. Although not at the
bottom, the Ninth Circuit performed poorly in one citation study of national
influence."l 0 It has also had some very bad years in the Supreme Court.12 ' The
size of the circuit could be a contributing factor. Where a circuit's workload is
higher and the judges do not work together as closely, the opportunities to learn
from the collective work of the circuit may be reduced. And although there is
much disagreement among the Ninth Circuit judges on this point, at least one
judge claims it is a "daunting task" to keep up with the court's opinions." 2
Perhaps if copyright cases were concentrated in some other circuit than the

119 Richard A. Posner, Is the Ninth Circuit Too Large?A StatisticalStudy of Judidal.Quahy, 29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 711 (2000).
120 Landes, Lessig & Solimine, supra note 39, at 304.
121 The Ninth Circuit's reversal rate during the 1983 and 1996 terms was very high. See Stephen

L. Washy, How the Ninth CircuitFaresin the Supreme Court: The InterircuitConflict Cases, 1SETON HALL
CIR. REv. 119, 120 (2005) ("Receiving particular recent attention was the 1996 Term, where 27 of
28 Ninth Circuit cases were reversed or vacated, and the 1983 Term, in which the reversal rate for
the Ninth Circuit was similar.") (footnote omitted).
122 Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, Ten Reasons WIhy the Ninth CircuitShould Be Spt, 6 ENGAGE 58, 60
(2005). But see Schroeder et al.,
supra note 24, at 63.
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Ninth, the results would be similar to those for the Second Circuit.
Unfortunately, there is no way to know with these data. It would be helpful to
know if the Ninth Circuit performs less well than other circuits in other subject
areas, even when it is more experienced.
Another explanation is that the Second Circuit over-performs in copyright not
because of the collective expertise of the circuit, but because of the individual
expertise of a few judges who happen to have served on the court. After all, even
the Second Circuit can struggle with copyright issues" 2 and produce poor
decisions. 24 The two most highly represented courts of appeals judges in the
casebooks by far are Judge Learned Hand and Judge Jon Newman, both of the
Second Circuit. Judge Hand is actually the most highly represented judge,
regardless of whether one counts unique opinions in the casebooks or weights the
opinions by the number of times they are reproduced. Weighting can ensure that
one casebook or casebook series does not unduly influence the results. The two
most plausible weights are the number of times the opinions are reprinted in a
casebook and the number of times the opinions are reprinted at least once in a
casebook series, where each series is treated as a single unit. When weighting by
casebook, the maximum multiplier is fifty-two. When weighting by series, it is
sixteen.
The casebooks reproduce nineteen of Judge Hand's majority opinions 141
times when weighting by casebook and fifty-two times when weighting by
casebook series. Judge Newman is immediately behind Judge Hand in two of
these three categories, with fourteen unique opinions reproduced seventy-seven
times by casebook and forty-six times by series. When weighting by casebook,
Justice O'Connor andJudgeJerome Frank are ahead ofJudge Newman's seventyseven reproductions. As the author of Feist Publications,Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Senice Co., 25 Stewart v.Abend,126 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,127 and
Harper& Row, Publishers,Inc. v. Naion Entepises,2 1 Justice O'Connor's opinions
are reproduced 107 times by casebook. Judge Frank's five majority opinions are

123

See Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1150 (2d Cir. 1987)

(Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the majority's results are
inconsistent with other Second Circuit copyright cases).
124 See Shaul v. Cherry Valley-Springfield Cent. Sch. Dist., 363 F.3d 177 (2d Cir. 2004).
According to Nimmer, the court "engaged in a wholly unnecessary inquiry, at both the trial and
appellate levels, into the work-for-hire status of public school teachers, inasmuch as the cause of
action there related solely to personal property." MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 1 NIMMER

§ 5.03 n.95.1 (2006).
499 U.S. 340 (1991).
126 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
127 489 U.S. 141 (1989).

ON COPYRIGHT
125

'28

471 U.S. 539 (1985).
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reproduced eighty times by casebook, just slightly ahead of Judge Newman.
Unlike judges of the courts of appeals, Supreme Court Justices like Justice
O'Connor can ensure a high representation in the casebooks with very few
opinions. Lower court judges, however, must earn their way into the casebooks,
except on those occasions when there is only one plausible opinion to choose
from. Judges Hand and Newman have clearly earned their way into the
casebooks. Although Judges Hand and Newman are well above other courts of
appeals judges in terms of casebook representation, several of the other top
performers are also Second Circuit judges.
In many areas of the law, viewing expertise in terms of individual judges rather
than courts as a whole may make sense. While judges do sometimes speak of
courts possessing collective expertise, they often speak of expertise in terms of
individual judges. The comparative advantage of some courts in certain areas of
the law could be so strong that the court is plausibly seen as having collective
expertise. The Federal Circuit is a good example. It handles so much more
patent litigation than any other circuit that all the judges should possess patent
expertise.129 The Eighth Circuit recently adopted Federal Circuit precedent on
substantive issues of patent law in toto, perhaps in part because of the Federal
Circuit's expertise. 3 ' But in most areas of the law, there are no such obvious
leaders.
In interviews with judges on the courts of appeals, David Klein concluded,
"Judges typically do not think of whole circuits in evaluative terms and so do not
weight precedents according to the circuit they come from."' 3' Much like Mott,
Klein asked about circuits with reputations for general excellence." 2 Klein also
33
asked the judges whether their own circuits possess special expertise.'
Apparently, he did not ask the judges whether other circuits have reputations in
specific subject areas, which, as suggested earlier, might have provoked different
responses. Interestingly, there was one exception to the judges' general reluctance
to ascribe reputations to circuits as a whole: the Ninth Circuit. One judge said,
"I'm thinking of those circuits we tend to look at for precedent. Maybe it's easier
to tell where we don't look.... [We don't look to the Ninth; it's in a category by
itself.' 34 Another judge said, "The only time I weight [a precedent according to
the circuit it came from] is if I hear the Ninth Circuit did something, I usually do
the opposite. The sign of the Ninth Circuit is negative."' 35 Klein's research offers
129 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
130

Schinzing v. Mid-States Stainless, Inc., 415 F.3d 807, 811 (8th Cit. 2005).
E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 93 (2002).

131 DAVID
132

Id.at 92.
168.
Id. at 93.

131Id. at
14
135

Id. (alterations in original).
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some insight into likely explanations for the present results in which only one of
the two most experienced circuits shows evidence of expertise, but the results
must ultimately remain inconclusive without additional evidence. However, even
if circuit-wide expertise is more doubtful, the present data do support thinking
about expertise at least in terms of individual judges.
V. CONCLUSION

Along with efficiency in decisionmaking, the other probable benefits of
'
specialized courts are uniformity in the law and expertise in decisionmaking. 36
This paper deals only with the benefits of expertise, but it is worth noting that the
Federal Circuit has not ensured uniformity in patent law; panel splits within the
Federal Circuit remain a significant problem. 3 ' The Federal Circuit may bring
needed expertise to patent law, but I have found little evidence that such expertise
is also needed in copyright law. In The FederalCourts: Challenge and Reform, Judge
Posner noted, "In most areas of federal law at present, there cannot be any
assurance that a specialized court, merely by virtue of specializing, would produce
better decisions."' 38 While the evidence is not decisive, this study suggests that
specialization does not improve copyright decisions. The Second Circuit, the
most experienced and influential circuit in the area of copyright, is much more
influential than its experience alone would suggest. The Ninth Circuit's influence,
however, is only slightly disproportionate to its experience. While the Ninth
Circuit's lesser performance might be due to its unusual size or other factors,
additional data is needed to determine if the Ninth Circuit is systematically

136

See Lawrence Baum, Speciafir#ng the FederalCourts: Neutral Reforms or Efforts to Shape Judidal

PoUg?, 74JUDICATURE 217, 217 (1991); David Currie & Frank I. Goodman, JudicalReview ofFederal
AdministrativeAction: Questfor the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 63-68 (1975).
117 CompareHewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 909
F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990),
with Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1990). These two
cases provide conflicting standards for the level of intent required to show inducement to infringe
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). Panel splits are not limited to opinions by different judges. Compare
Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 363 F.3d 1263, 1274 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (opinion
by Gajarsa, J.) (citing the Hewlett-Packardstandard and then Manville as a contrary authority), with
Minn. Mining & Mfg. v. Chemque, Inc., 303 F.3d 1294, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (opinion by Gajarsa,
J.) (citing the Manville standard and then Hewlett-Packardasa contrary authority). The Federal Circuit
has repeatedly acknowledged this conflict without resolving it. See MEMC Electronic Materials, Inc.
v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d 1369, 1378 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting the "lack of
clarity"); MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323,1332 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated126 S. Ct.
1837 (2006); Insituform Techs., Inc. v. CAT Contracting, Inc., 385 F.3d 1360, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
See also Federal Circuit Bar Association Patent and Trademark Appeals Committee, Confictsin Federal
Circuit Patent Law Decisions, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 723 (2001) (reviewing Federal Circuit conflicts
generally).
138 RicHARD A POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 254
(1996).
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performing poorly as compared to other experienced circuits. In evaluating the
present data, it would be helpful to know whether similar patterns hold in other
subject areas, preferably ones where the most experienced circuits vary. This
study could be replicated in any area where there is competition among the courts
of appeals for space in the casebooks. This excludes some areas of the law, such
as patent law, which is dominated by the Federal Circuit, and constitutional law,
which is dominated by the Supreme Court. If the most experienced circuits vary
across subjects and, excepting the Ninth Circuit, the most experienced circuits are
disproportionately influential relative to their caseloads, there would then be less
worry that something special about the Second Circuit is responsible for its high
performance in this study. David Nimmer playfully referred to the Second Circuit
as the "Copyright Specialists.' '139 He's right, but without more evidence to explain
the Ninth Circuit's lower performance, it is premature to attribute the Second
Circuit's higher performance to its expertise in copyright relative to the other
circuits, at least to expertise in the Second Circuit as a whole. Instead, copyright
law seems quite safe in the hands of generalist courts-and the occasional
copyright experts who are members of these courts.

139 David Nimmer, 'Fairestof Them All" and Other Fair Taks ofFairUse, 66 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 263, 263 (2003); see alsoJamesH. Carter, Th Know It When They See It: CopyrightandAesthetics
in the Second Circuit,65 ST.JOHN'S L. REv. 773, 773 (1991) ("The Second Circuit is widely recognized
as the nation's most important copyright court.").
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APPENDIX C
PRINCIPAL CASES APPEARING IN TEN OR MORE COPYRIGHT CASEBOOKS 1"
CASEBOOKS

CASE

31

Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880) (Bradley).

31

Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903)
(Holmes).

31

Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884) (Miller).

31

Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) (L.
Hand).

28

Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir.
1951) (Frank).

27

Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (Pitney).

25

Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) (Reed).

24

Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976)
(Lumbard).

24

Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936)
(L. Hand).

22

Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539
(1985) (O'Connor).

22

Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967)
(Aldrich).

22

Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417
(1984) (Stevens).

21

Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643 (1943)
(Frankfurter).

20

Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d
Cir. 1983) (Sloviter).

19

Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank).

19

Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) (Black).

'4 Because I recorded all cases in the thirty-one copyright casebooks but not all of the cases in
the intellectual property casebooks, only the former are represented in this table. Three cases in this
table are excluded from the analysis in the paper for not qualifying as copyright opinions under the
definition used in this Article, Murray v. NationalBroadcastingCo., 844 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1988); Smith

v. Montom, 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981); and HaelanLabs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d

866 (2d Cir. 1953).
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18

Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989) (T.
Marshall).

18

Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964)
(Black).

18

Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (Burger).

18

Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir.
1980) (Oakes).

17

Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1968)
(Friendly).

17

Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir.
1985) (Mansfield).

17

Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340
(1991) (O'Connor).
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990) (O'Connor).

17
16
16

Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d
Cir. 1953) (Frank).
Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591 (1917) (Holmes).

16

Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir.
1960) (L. Hand).

is

G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 199 F.2d 469 (2d Cir.

1951) (Swan).
15

Pushman v. New York Graphic Soc., Inc., 287 N.Y. 302 (N.Y. 1942)
(Desmond).

15

Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates, 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (Wyatt).
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APPENDIX D
COPYRIGHT AND GENERAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASEBOOKS
COPYRIGHT CASEBOOKS
JULIE E. COHEN, LYDIA PALLAS LOREN, RUTH GANA OKEDIJI, & MAUREEN A.
O'ROURKE, COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY (Aspen 2002).
1 FRANCIS DEAK & FREDERICK CHAIT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COPYRIGHT

PROTECTION (unpublished casebook 1940).
SHELDON HALPERN, COPYRIGHT LAW:

PROTECTION OF ORIGINAL EXPRESSION

(Carolina Academic Press 2002).
SHELDON W. HALPERN, DAVID E. SHIPLEY & HOWARD B. ABRAMS, COPYRIGHT: CASES
AND MATERIALS (West 1992).
CRAIG CRAIG, COPYRIGHT LAW (Matthew Bender 1986).
CRAIG JOYCE, WILLIAM PATRY, MARSHALL LEAFFER & PETERJASZI, COPYRIGHT LAW

(2d ed. 1991).
CRAIG JOYCE, WILLIAM PATRY, MARSHALL LEAFFER & PETER JASZI, COPYRIGHT LAW

(3d ed. 1994).
CRAIG JOYCE, WILLIAM PATRY, MARSHALL LEAFFER & PETERJASZI, COPYRIGHT LAW

(4th ed. 1998).
CRAIG JOYCE, WILLIAM PATRY, MARSHALL LEAFFER & PETERJASZI, COPYRIGHT LAW

(5th ed. 2001).
CRAIGJOYCE, MARSHALL LEAFFER, PETERJASZI & TYLER OCHOA, COPYRIGHT LAW (6th

ed. 2003).
BENJAMIN KAPLAN, RALPH S. BROWN,JR., ROBERTA. GORMAN &ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN,
CASES ON COPYRIGHT, UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND OTHER TOPICS BEARING ON THE
PROTECTION OF LITERARY, MUSICAL, AND ARTISTIC WORKS (Foundation Press 1960).

BENJAMIN KAPLAN & RALPH S. BROWN,JR., COPYRIGHT, UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND
OTHER TOPICS BEARING ON THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY, MUSICAL, AND ARTISTIC

WORKS (2d ed. 1974).
BENJAMIN KAPLAN & RALPH S. BROWN, JR., CASES ON COPYRIGHT, UNFAIR
COMPETITION, AND OTHER TOPICS BEARING ON THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY,
MUSICAL, AND ARTISTIC WORKS (3d ed. 1978).
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BENJAMIN KAPLAN & RALPH S. BROWN, JR. & ROBERT C. DENICOLA, CASES ON
COPYRIGHT, UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND OTHERTOPICS BEARING ON THE PROTECTION
OF LITERARY, MUSICAL, AND ARTISTIC WORKS (4th ed. 1985).
RALPH S. BROWN,JR. & ROBERTC. DENICOLA, COPYRIGHT, UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND
OTHER TOPICS BEARING ON THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY, MUSICAL, AND ARTISTIC
WORKS

(5th ed. 1990).

RALPH S. BROWN,JR. & ROBERTC. DENICOLA, COPYRIGHT, UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND
OTHER TOPICS BEARING ON THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY, MUSICAL, AND ARTISTIC
WORKS (6th ed. 1995).
RALPH S. BROWN,JR. & ROBERT C. DENICOLA, COPYRIGHT, UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND
RELATED TOPICS BEARING ON THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY, MUSICAL, AND ARTISTIC
WORKS

(7th ed. 1998).

RALPH S. BROWN,JR. & ROBERT C. DENICOLA, COPYRIGHT, UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND
RELATED TOPICS BEARING ON THE PROTECTION OF WORKS OF AUTHORSHIP (8th ed.

2002).
RALPH S. BROWN,J R. & ROBERT C. DENCOLA,,
COPYRIGHT, U ,NFAIR CMPETIION, AN
RELATED TOPICS BEARING ON THE PROTECTION OF WORKS OF AUTHORSHIP (9th ed.

2005).
ALAN LATMAN & ROBERT

A.

GORMAN, COPYRIGHT FOR THE EIGHTIES

ALAN LATMAN, ROBERT
EIGHTIES (2d ed. 1985).

A.

GORMAN & JANE

C.

(Michie 1981).

GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE

ALAN LATMAN, ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE
NINETIES: CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 1989).
ROBERTA. GORMAN &JANE
MATERIALS (4th ed. 1993).

C. GINSBURG,

COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES: CASES AND

ROBERTA. GORMAN &JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT: CASES AND MATERIALS

(5th ed.

1999).
ROBERT

A.

GORMAN & JANE

C.

GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT:

CASES AND MATERIALS

(Foundation Press, 6th ed. 2002).
MELVILLE B. NIMMER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COPYRIGHT AND OTHER ASPECTS OF
LAW PERTAINING TO LITERARY, MUSICAL AND ARTISTIC WORKS (West 1971).
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MELVILLE B. NIMMER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COPYRIGHT AND OTHER ASPECTS OF
LAW PERTAINING TO LITERARY, MUSICAL AND ARTISTIC WORKS (2d ed. 1979).
MELVILLE B. NIMMER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COPYRIGHT AND OTHER ASPECTS OF
ENTERTAINMENT LITIGATION (3d ed. 1985).
MELVILLE B. NIMMER, PAUL MARCUS, DAVID A. MYERS & DAVID NIMMER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON COPYRIGHT AND OTHER ASPECTS OF ENTERTAINMENT LITIGATION
INCLUDING UNFAIR COMPETITION, DEFAMATION, PRIVACY, ILLUSTRATED (4th ed. 1991).
MELVILLE B. NIMMER, PAUL MARCUS, DAVID A. MYERS & DAVID NIMMER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON COPYRIGHT AND OTHER ASPECTS OF ENTERTAINMENT LITIGATION
INCLUDING UNFAIR COMPETITION, DEFAMATION, PRIVACY, ILLUSTRATED (Matthew

Bender, 5th ed. 1999).
MELVILLE B. NIMMER, PAUL MARCUS, DAVID A. MYERS & DAVID NIMMER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON COPYRIGHT AND OTHERASPECTS OF ENTERTAINMENT LITIGATION (6th

ed. 2000).
GENERAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASEBOOKS
MARGRETH BARRETT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS 2-26,350-599,

924-68 (West 1995).
MARGRETH BARRETr, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS 2-34,394-673,

1056-1107 (2d ed. 2001).
ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS & ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADEMARK, COPYRIGHT AND PATENT LAW

232-551 (Foundation Press 1996).
ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS & ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADEMARK, COPYRIGHT AND PATENT LAW

212-563 (2d ed. 2004).
THOMAS FIELD, INTRODUCTION TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

163-298, 339-74

(Carolina Academic Press 2003).
E. ERNEST GOLDSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT, TRADE-MARK, AND
COPYRIGHT LAW 10, 114-46, 179-85, 203-06, 281-322, 371-400, 589-672, 710-20
(Foundation Press 1959).
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK, AND RELATED STATE
DOCTRINES 8-19, 190-243, 605-775, 787-92, 812-20, 829-43, 867-92 (Callaghan and

Co. 1973).
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PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK, AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES
9-15, 195-241, 652-871, 881-85, 918-32 (Foundation Press 2d ed. 1981).
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK, AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES
2-10, 168-169, 528-827, 870-95, 910-38) (3d ed. 1990).
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK, AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES

8-14, 173-74, 552-814, 817-85, 938-62, 982-91, 996-1011 (4th ed. 1997).
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK, AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES

8-13, 568-802, 805-93, 955-79, 999-1008 (5th ed. 2002).
EDMUND W. KITCH & HARVEY S. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE

PROCESS 526-759, 786-932, 1056-1202 (Foundation Press 1972).
EDMUND W. KITCH & HARVEY S. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE

PROCESS 486-507, 620-795 (2d ed. 1979).
EDMUND W. KITCH & HARVEY S. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE

PROCESS 471-90, 582-746 (3d ed. 1986).
EDMUND W. KITCH & HARVEY S. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE

PROCESS 446-63, 553-770 (4th ed. 1989).
EDMUND W. KITCH & HARVEY S. PERLMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION 396-414, 536-800 (5th ed. 1998).
DAVID LANGE, MARY LAFRANCE, & GARY MYERS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CASES

AND MATERIALS 6-85, 644-1009, 1018-83 (West 1998).
DAVID LANGE, MARY LAFRANCE, & GARY MYERS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CASES
AND MATERIALS 2-81, 616-1233 (2d ed. 2003).
ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL, MARK A. LEMLEY & THOMAS M. JORDE,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 1-22, 23-26, 321-522,
752-56, 804-25, 860-955 (Aspen 1997).
ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL, MARK A. LEMLEY & THOMAS M. JORDE,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 1-22, 23-27, 345-556,

810-13, 867-88, 911-1007 (2d ed. 2000).
ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL, MARK A. LEMLEY & THOMAS M. JORDE,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 319-528, 841-51,

869-931 (3d ed. 2003).
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